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Appellants hereby submit the following Supplemental Briefing to address the
questions posed by the Court (restated in bold font).
I.

DEFINE THE CONTOURS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS THE
PLAINTIFFS ARE ASSERTING IN THIS CASE BY OUTLINING THE
FOLLOWING:
A

What right or rights arise under the Utah State Constitution that the
Jensens claim have been violated in this case? Please include any case
law, statute, or historical evidence to support the assertion of this right.

The Jensens claim that the following rights have been violated:
1.

The right to direct their child's medical care free from governmental
interference, unless such interference is narrowly tailored and in
furtherance of a compelling state interest.

The Court has already expressly recognized this right under Art. I, § 7. In In re
J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1373, the Court wrote:
The integrity of the family and the parents' inherent right and authority to
rear their own children have been recognized as fundamental axioms of AngloAmerican culture, presupposed by all our social, political, and legal institutions.
"To protect the (individual) in his constitutionally guaranteed right to form and
preserve the family is one of the basic principles for which organized government
is established ...." "The family is the basis of our society." "The family entity is
the core element upon which modern civilization is founded." "This primary role
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition."
This parental right transcends all property and economic rights. It is rooted
not in state or federal statutory or constitutional law, to which it is logically and
chronologically prior, but in nature and human instinct. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court has declared that "the liberty interest in family privacy has its
source ... in intrinsic human rights...."
Similarly, this Court has stated that the parent's right, as well as duty, to
care for a child "may be termed natural, as well as legal and moral." More
recently, this Court has spoken of "the natural right and authority of the parent to
the child's custody," and of "the prior and fundamental right of a parent to rear his
child....".
1

Id. at 1373-1374 (citations omitted).1
In summarizing its holding in J.P., this Court stated in Wells v. Children's AidSoc.
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984):
In re J.P., supra, identified parental rights as "fundamental" for purposes of
due process. 648 P.2d at 1372-74. In the context of alleged vagueness in statutory
language, we have held that "[w]hen state action impinges on fundamental rights,
due process requires standards which clearly define the scope of permissible
conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights." In re Boyer, Utah,
636 P.2d 1085, 1087-88 (1981). Similarly, "to avoid unwarranted intrusion" on the
fundamental rights of parenthood we hold that Utah's Due Process Clause requires
a higher level of scrutiny than is exercised to determine the validity of economic
regulation. By analogy to the tests employed in judging the validity of alleged
infringements on other fundamental rights, we hold that the proponent of
legislation infringing parental rights must show (1) a compelling state interest in
the result to be achieved and (2) that the means adopted are "narrowly tailored to
achieve the basic statutory purpose." Id. at 1090.
It has thus been settled in Utah since at least 1981 that it violates Art. I, § 7 of the
Utah Constitution for a state actor to interfere with the fundamental parental right of
rearing one's child - which would include the essential role of directing the child's
medical care, see, e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003)unless the state actor can meet the burden of showing that such interference was
"narrowly tailored" to achieve a "compelling state interest."
1

The Court further observed: "We deal here with a fundamental principle. The
Constitution of Utah declares, 'Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.' Article I, § 27.
The cornerstone of democratic government is the conviction that governments exist at the
sufferance of the people, in whom 4(a)ll political power is inherent....' Utah Const. Art. I,
§ 2. A residuum of liberty reposes in the people. That liberty is not limited to the exercise
of rights specifically enumerated in either the United States or the Utah Constitutions.
Thus, Article I, § 25 of the Utah Constitution states, 'This enumeration of rights shall not
be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.'" In re J.P., 648 P.2d at
1372-73.
2

There are no Utah cases in which the parties raised Art. I § 1 in the parent-child
context. However, the Court has recognized that certain freedoms guaranteed under the
Utah Constitution originate from more than one textual provision. See American Bush v.
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, If 17, 140 P.3d 1235 (The "framers of the Utah
Constitution divided the freedom of speech guarantees into three distinct clauses" in Art.
I §§ 1 and 2). "[Constitutional interpretation!] [] dictate[s] that when determining the
meaning of a constitutional provision, 'other provisions dealing generally with the same
topic ... assist us in arriving at a proper interpretation of the constitutional provision in
question.5" Id. at ^f 18, quoting In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866-67 (Utah 1996).
Since article I, section 1 and article I, section 15 are both directed toward
expression, it is entirely appropriate, in fact necessary, that we construe
these two provisions together. Indeed, this court has specifically held that
"article I, section 15 must be read in conjunction with other constitutional
provisions ... [including] [t]he opening provision of the Utah Constitution."
West, 872 P.2d at 1015 (emphasis added); see also Redding v. Brady, 606
P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1980) (construing article I, section 1 and article I,
section 15 in concert).
Id. at K 18; see also Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978) (state's due
process clause should be read with clause recognizing inherent rights of enjoying life and
liberty and pursuing happiness, which rights include "the right to establish and maintain a
home and family relations").
In this case, § § 1 and 7 are both directed toward guaranteeing and preserving
individual rights and liberties, and may be read together when construing the Jensens5
rights under the Utah Constitution. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 670, 675
(Utah 1985); State ex rel. Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 72 P. 388, 389 (1903).

3

Moreover, application of In re J.P. and Wells to § 1 requires nothing more than
application of plain language. "Liberty" within § 1 is not just the absence of physical
restraint, but "a term of comprehensive scope. It embraces not only freedom from
servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of person, but also all our
religious, civil, political, and personal rights[.]" Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P.
22, 24 (1904); State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 69 (1964) (The right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, "and as a corresponding and accompanying right,
the right to privacy in his own home/' is a "just claim, God given, or innate as a human").
Section 1 expressly states that the inherent rights of defending life and liberty are
guaranteed, and In re J.P. and Wells expressly state that the right to rear one's child is
one of those inherent rights. See also 16A CJ.S. § 377 (summarizing other states'
interpretations of inalienable rights provision as guaranteeing enjoyment of domestic
relations and privileges of the family and the home, and protection of one's health).
2.

The right to follow medical recommendations of a licensed physician
of their choosing, unless the State can establish that the
recommendations are substantially below the norm.

Concomitant with the right to direct medical care is the right to follow the
recommendations of a licensed physician in whom the parents have confidence. A state
actor cannot interfere with, or penalize the parent for, choosing that physician instead of
one whom the state considers "better". To do so is to impose a standard of comparative
fitness on the parents, which this Court has long recognized as prohibited by Art. I, § 7.
See Brief of Appellant at pp. 47-48, and 51-56 (citing cases, historical support, statutes,

4

and commentary). Every court in the United States to address this concept in the context
of medical care has reached the same conclusion. See Brief of Appellants at 52-57.
3.

The right not to be reported to the State for neglect because the
parents are seeking confirmation of a diagnosis before implementing
a state actor's medical recommendations.

When a right is guaranteed under the constitution, it is as much interference to
penalize a parent for exercising the right as it is to prevent such exercise. Stated
differently, accusing a parent of neglect for exercising the right to direct medical care
guaranteed by Art. I, §§ 1 and 7 is itself a violation of those constitutional guarantees.
This principle is not only inherent, but also follows from the plain language of Art. I, § 1,
which guarantees the right to "defend" life and liberty.
4,

The right to an investigation of the reporting party's allegations
before being forced to defend against State efforts to transfer
custody in order to impose medical procedures on a child.

The statutory prerequisites for interference with a family by DCFS employees
codify constitutional minima:
(1) (a) Courts have recognized a general presumption that it is in the best
interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and supervision
of his natural parents. A child's need for a normal family life in a
permanent home, and for positive, nurturing family relationships will
usually best be met by his natural parents. Additionally, the integrity of the
family unit, and the right of parents to conceive and raise their children
have found protection in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The right of a fit.

2

The only exception is if the state actor can demonstrate that the physician's
recommendations equate to "substantial" neglect. In this case, all medical witnesses
(except defendant Wagner) agree that seeking confirmation of a diagnosis with reliable,
inexpensive, and available genetic / molecular testing is a reasonable request.

5

competent parent to raise his child has long been protected by the laws and
Constitution of this state and of the United States.
(b) It is the public policy of this state that parents retain the fundamental
right and duty to exercise primary control over the care, supervision,
upbringing, and education of their children who are in their custody.
U.C.A. § 62A-4a-201(l)(2003)(emphasis added).
The Jensens were entitled to a "thorough pre-removal investigation" upon DCFS's
receipt of a report of child abuse or neglect. See U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(l)(a) (2003); Utah
Admin. R. 512-201-1 & 201-4 (2003) (child protective services caseworker must
complete an "accurate and timely investigation"). Absent an investigation, no argument
can be made that a parent had received "due" or fair process, or that submitting an
affidavit containing misrepresentations is narrowly tailored conduct. Moreover, statutory
requirements of an investigation not only reflect constitutional standards, but also create a
protected liberty interest in themselves. See, e.g., Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 931
P.2d 147, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing liberty interest for purposes of Art. I, § 7 in
statutory parole grant process). A party cannot be deprived under §§1 and 7 except by
means that are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
5.

The right to be free from proceedings to transfer custody that are
tainted by reckless or intentional material misrepresentations or
omissions by state actors.

A parent's entitlement under Art. I, § 7 to a procedurally sound involvement with
DCFS and the juvenile court has long been established in Utah. Wells, supra at 204, and
cases cited; Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah
1982); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982). "The general test for the validity of

6

such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness." Wells, at 204. As a matter of
law and common sense, the making of misrepresentations cannot be narrowly tailored
conduct, nor "due" process. See Brief of Appellants at 46-47, 50.
6.

The right to be free from unreasonable custodial and non-custodial
seizures.

The right to be free from unreasonable seizures is explicitly stated in Art. I, § 14.
By definition, a seizure resulting from culpable material misrepresentations or omissions
cannot be "reasonable."

Similarly, § 14's requirement that seizures be based upon

probable cause "supported by oath or affirmation" cannot be satisfied if a state actor's
oath or affirmation is false. Additional historical context for the Framers' intent to
protect residents from false statements is set forth in the Brief of Appellants at pp. 58-60.
That the Framers expected the rights guaranteed under § 14 to extend to noncustodial seizures is equally undeniable. See Brief of Appellants, pp. 60-62.
B.

What specific action or actions taken by each defendant do the
plaintiffs allege violated those rights? Please include a separate
paragraph or section for each individual defendant.

Pursuant to the Court's directive to avoid repeating factual assertions, the Jensens'
earlier fact statements are incorporated herein. Actions that the Jensens contend were
violative - in their totality or individually - with exemplar record citations include:
1.

Defendant Wagner

Wagner recklessly and/or intentionally3 made material factual misrepresentations
and omissions (hereinafter "made misrepresentations") to DCFS in order to induce DCFS

3

The Jensens' claims do not require "deliberate" misconduct; recklessness would suffice.
7

to seek a transfer of custody. (R.R.3407-11, 2306 2365, 3395, 3398, 2139-41, 2417-18,
2422-23, 2429.) Wagner made similar misrepresentations to the juvenile court through
an affidavit in order to induce a transfer of custody and the forcing of chemotherapy on
Parker. (R. 3156-57, 3607-09.) Wagner made misrepresentations to co-workers and a
supervisor, who would have honored the Jensens' request for diagnostic testing had they
known of it. (R.2751-53, 2758-59, 2763, 3411, 1879, 1881, 1904-05, 1910-11, 1879-80,
3378-79, 3396-97.)
Wagner prevented a pre-referral meeting between the Jensens, Wagner, Dr.
Corwin (an independent liaison), and the Jensens' chosen physician (Moore) by falsely
telling Corwin that Parker's condition could not wait another 3 days. (R. 3396-97, 2429.)
Wagner interfered with the Jensens' request for independent confirmation by contacting
and attempting to influence the reviewing physician at Dana Farber. (R.2306, 2365,
2369-71, 3427-28.) Wagner reported the Jensens to the state for medical neglect because
they informed PCMC that they were going to go elsewhere to seek confirmation of the
diagnosis. (R.2412.)
2.

Defendant Cunningham

Cunningham failed or refused to conduct any investigation of the medical neglect
allegations (let alone the required investigation), taking no steps to investigate after
receiving the report from the accusing party. (R. 1919-21, 3431-32, 1876, 1891, 1892-94,
1906, 1922-23, 3431, 1884, 1560-61.)4

For the purpose of initiating and later

4

Cunningham has argued that she was excused from performing an investigation because
she was told by Wagner that it was an emergency. While Wagner has not conceded such,
8

perpetuating the juvenile court proceedings, Cunningham submitted one verified petition
and two affidavits that she admits presented only the State's side of the story and
contained misleading information.

(R. 3435-51, 3440-46, 1893-93, 1903-04.)

Cunningham issued a finding that the medical neglect allegations were "supported"
despite having conducted no investigation. (R.3344-45, 1892-94.) Cunningham did not
consider letting the Jensens rely on a physician of their choosing (Moore) because she
accepted the reporting doctor's assertion that Moore was not "qualified" to treat Parker.
(R.1883, 1913-14.)

When submitting an affidavit to obtain a transfer of custody,

Cunningham knew and did not disclose that the "controlling" test results were not in yet.
(R.2863.)
3.

Defendant Anderson

Anderson imposed a standard of comparative fitness on the Jensens, taking the
position that, if there were conflicting opinions between a parent's physician and a
physician upon whom the State is relying, the parents could not make the choice; instead,
DCFS could force the parents into court and have the court decide "the more credible or
the best treatment that is going to happen from the recommendation of the State or the
parents." (R.1678.) Similarly, Anderson refused to authorize the dismissal of the neglect
proceedings unless Parker was placed in the care of a board-certified pediatric oncologist.
(R. 1577-78.) Anderson refused to include additional diagnostic testing as part of DCFS's
even under the emergency guidelines, Cunningham was required to "meet with the
parents, attempt to negotiate voluntary compliance with medical treatment pending or in
lieu of court involvement, and assess and document the parents' reasons for refusal to
treat," (R. 3431-32), none of which she did. Indeed, Cunningham never ran allegations
of neglect by PCMC past any other doctor. (R. 1870-71.)
9

pursuit of the medical neglect allegations unless the Jensens agreed to place Parker in
foster care. (R.2587-88.) Anderson knew and did not disclose that the Idaho physician
was not honoring a court-entered stipulation by waiting until test results were back before
making a recommendation. (R. 1601.)
4.

Defendant Eisenman

Eisenman made misrepresentations to the juvenile court in order to perpetuate the
proceedings and to obtain warrants, a transfer of custody, and forced chemotherapy. (R.
2545-47, 3508-09, 2370-71,

1980-82,

1991, 2863, 2026.)

Eisenman made

misrepresentations to her supervisor for the purpose of perpetuating the juvenile court
proceedings. (R.3042-43, 3045-47, 3049, 3053-54.) Eisenman told the Jensens that she
would not allow the Jensens to use Dr. Birkmayer because he was not licensed in the
United States, when she knew that the State could not legally prohibit parents from taking
their child to another country for medical treatment. (R.3507, 1987-89.) Eisenman
performed a skewed investigation.

(R.3535, 1990-91, 1490-91.)

Eisenman made

misrepresentations to the District Attorney's office that caused the filing of felony
charges, upon which Daren Jensen was arrested and Daren and Barbara Jensen were
seized. (R.2928, 1946, 3485-86.)
5.

Defendant Albritton

Albritton made misrepresentations to the juvenile court in order to perpetuate the
proceedings, impose a comparative fitness standard on the Jensens, and induce forced
medication on Parker. (R.1943, 2024-25, 2012, 2863, 1488, 1512, 1980-81.)

10

II.

DESCRIBE WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT GIVE
RISE TO THE RIGHTS ASSERTED ARE OR ARE NOT SELFEXECUTING BY APPLYING THE TEST WE ESTABLISHED IN
SPACEMAN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BOX ELDER COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 2000 UT 87,16 P.3d 533.
In Spackman, this Court held that Art. I §7 is self-executing. 2000 UT 87, ^j 10 (§

7). Under the Spackman analysis, §§1 and 14 are also self-executing. "In essence, a
self-executing constitutional clause is one that can be judicially enforced without
implementing legislation." Id. ^f 7. "[I]f the framers intended the provision to have
immediate effect and if no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right
given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed, the provision is self-executing."

Id.,

quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996)(internal citations omitted).
In determining that § 7 is self-executing, the Spackman court first recognized that
it is prohibitory. In addition to its wording ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law") the Court noted that "the Utah Constitution
states that all of its provisions are 'mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words
they are declared to be otherwise.' Utah Const., art. I, § 26," and § 7 does not contain
any such declaration.5
Section 1 likewise contains no declaration rebutting the presumption that it is
mandatory and prohibitory, and has been recognized by this Court as prohibitory. Block,
76 P. at 24 (§ 1 "forbids the abridgement" of rights). Section 14 is prohibitory by its
language ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
5

The presumption that constitutional provisions are mandatory and prohibitory also
exists at common law. See Davidson v. G. F. Sandstrom, 83 P.3d 648, 658 (Colo. 2004,
En Banc), and cases cited.
11

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation . . . ."), and there is
no declaration rebutting the constitutional presumption.
The Spackman court next observed that, "although the right to due process [in § 7]
is expressed in relatively general terms, it is both judicially definable and enforceable.
Indeed, this court has already defined and enforced the clause on numerous occasions
without implementing legislation." 2000 UT 87, ^ 12.
Section 1 has been defined and applied by this Court numerous times without
implementing legislation. See, e.g., Saville v. Cor less, 46 Utah 495, 151 P. 51, 52 (1915);
Golding v. Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937); Ritholz v. City of Salt
Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955); West Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613,
618 (Utah App. 1993); Block, 76 P. at 24-26 (§§ 1 and 7 "are constitutional guaranties");
see also Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C, 684 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Iowa 2004) (interpreting
similar inalienable rights clause in Iowa's state constitution as "not a mere glittering
generality without substance or meaning," holding that it was intended to be judicially
enforced), and cases cited.6

6

Utah's "inalienable rights" provision has appeared in each version of the state
constitution, beginning with the 1849 Constitution of the State of Deseret. A persuasive
argument has been made that the 1849 Constitution was drafted by the Council of Fifty of
the LDS Church. See Peter Crawley, "The Constitution of the State of Deseret," 29
BYU Studies 4:7 (1989). Whether that occurred or (as the official story went) it was
drafted at a territorial convention, many of its drafters had recently arrived from Iowa.
Id. Not surprisingly, therefore, it was modeled after Iowa's constitution. Kenneth R.
Wallentine, "Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah
Constitution, Article I, Section 14," 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 267, 274 (1991).
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Art. I § 14 has also been defined and applied numerous times by this Court,
perhaps more than any other state constitutional provision. See, e.g., State v. Roybal,
2010 UT 34, If 2, — P.3d —; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (1994); State v. Thompson, 810
P.2d 415, 417-18, 420 (Utah 1991); State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 1978).
III.

DISCUSS THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MONEY DAMAGES FOR THE
ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS BY APPLYING THE
THREE PART TEST WE ARTICULATED IN SPACKMAN.
EVALUATION UNDER THIS TEST WILL REQUIRE ANALYSIS OF THE
FOLLOWING:
a)
b)
c)

A.

Was there a flagrant violation?
Were other remedies available?
Were equitable remedies adequate to redress the Jensens'
injuries?

Flagrancy of Constitutional Violations

In Spackman, § 23, this Court explained that a "flagrant" constitutional violation
essentially
means that a defendant must have violated "clearly established"
constitutional rights "of which a reasonable person would have known."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396
(1982). To be considered clearly established, "[t]he contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted).
In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate a right as clearly established, it "does not
mean that there must be a published case involving identical facts; otherwise [courts]
would be required to 'find qualified immunity wherever we have a new fact pattern.5
Instead, 'a general constitutional rule can apply with obvious clarity to the specific
conduct in question, even though such conduct has not previously been held unlawful.5"
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York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2008) {quoting Casey v. City
of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir.2007)) (internal citations omitted).7
In Hope v. Pelzer, the United States Supreme Court emphasized:
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has been held unlawful, but it is to say that in
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). "Hope thus shifted the qualified immunity analysis from a scavenger
hunt for prior cases with precisely the same facts toward the more relevant inquiry of
whether the law put officials on fair notice that the described conduct was
unconstitutional." Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004).
If conduct has been addressed in case law, or is inherently or obviously wrong, or
violates the plain wording of a constitutional provision, a defendant is on fair notice. (As
an example of the latter, if a jury were to find that defendant Wagner reported the Jensens
because they insisted on verifying the diagnosis before subjecting their child to lifealtering chemotherapy - defending their child's "life and liberty" - it would be a
violation of the plain language of Art. I § 1.)
When a determination of flagrancy depends upon the resolution of underlying fact,
this element cannot be determined as a matter of law. See Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29,

7

The recognition that some actions are obviously improper is perhaps analogous to the
common law's recognition that while some actions are criminalized by virtue of statute
{malum prohibitum), some are just plain wrong {malum in se). State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d
190, 407 P.2d 571, 574 (1965).
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TI 28, 184 P.3d 592 (dispute of fact regarding the defendant's conduct precluded finding
as a matter of law of whether it was flagrant).
The settled, inherent, or obvious nature of each of the constitutional rights at issue
in this case has largely been incorporated in the discussion of those rights above, pp. 1-7.
All five of the state actor defendants were on notice that making material
misrepresentations to a court, or to others to induce or facilitate court proceedings, was
wrongful, particularly in the context of interference with a fundamental parent-child
relationship.
No reasonable official could believe that such conduct is narrowly tailored, or that
it affords "due" process, or that it is reasonable. See, e.g., Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1298 ("The
actions of a police forensic analyst who prevaricates and distorts evidence to convince the
prosecuting authorities to press charges is no less reprehensible than an officer who,
through false statements, prevails upon a magistrate to issue a warrant. In each case the
government official maliciously abuses a position of trust to induce the criminal justice
system to confine and then to prosecute an innocent defendant.... There is no moral,
constitutional, common law, or common sense difference between providing phony
evidence in support of an arrest and providing phony evidence in support of continued
confinement and prosecution. Even if there were no case directly on point imposing
liability on officials whose falsification of evidence occurred at the post-arrest stage, an
official in Ms. Gilchrist's position could not have labored under any misapprehension that
the knowing or reckless falsification and omission of evidence was objectively
reasonable"); Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306 (10th
15

Cir. 1999) ("Officials cannot reasonably assume that the law permits them to obtain a
custody order in retaliation for a parent's retaining counsel and through reckless omission
of probative facts to a magistrate.55); Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990)
("Construed liberally, the allegations of judicial deception may state a claim that the
deputies deliberately or recklessly incorporated known falsehoods into their reports,
criminal complaints and warrant applications. If this claim were true, then the deputies'
sworn representations as to the existence of probable cause would be perjury, or close to
it, and perjury is not objectively reasonable conduct.55)
Similarly, if a jury finds that a defendant's actions were motivated by personal
reasons, such finding would preclude the defendant from arguing that a reasonable
official could believe such actions to have been in furtherance of a "compelling state
interest.55 This principle would apply, for example, if a jury found that:
• Wagner's actions were at any point motivated by personal affront at the
Jensens5 questioning of his recommendations, or by his initial desire to enroll Parker in a
clinical trial.
• Cunningham declined to do an investigation because she felt overworked
or simply did not like doing investigations (hence her subsequent actions in going back
and padding her hours, making up activities that she did not even perform).
• Eisenman5s actions were based on a personal agenda.
• Albritton5s actions were due to a personal bias against the Burzynski
Clinic or in favor of her close colleague Wagner.
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• Anderson's acknowledgement that the Jensens were not neglectful
parents, but that "We can't have it over. It's gone too far," reflected that the continuation
of the proceedings had become political in nature.
With respect to Cunningham and Anderson, one does not have to speculate as to
what a reasonable official could have believed about the requirement of an investigation,
because the state legislature had expressly told them. No reasonable official could claim
she thought it was narrowly tailored conduct, or a fair process to perform no investigation
at all, and instead to rely solely upon an accusing doctor to explain the parents' reasons much like relying on an ex-wife in a bitter divorce to articulate the husband's side of the
story. Cunningham knew that, unlike typical litigation, juvenile court proceedings are
not adversarial, and DCFS - as the body charged with investigating reported abuse - is
presumed by the courts to be neutral in its presentation, thus conferring more weight
upon the factual assertions of DCFS employees. Cunningham admits that she knew this,
and that her sworn statements in no way met that standard.
Cunningham went even further, adopting and representing as her own "personal
knowledge" the reporting doctor's accusations as if she had investigated them. These
sworn statements enabled both the initiation of the juvenile court proceedings and, for
later affidavits, the transfer of custody, and continuation of warrants. No reasonable
official could consider such conduct to be a "narrowly tailored" means of furthering a
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compelling state interest, nor consistent with a well established right to "due" process and
reasonable conduct.8
With respect to Anderson, as discussed above, this Court has repeatedly held that
imposing a standard whereby the state requires parents to prove that their child-rearing
decisions are "better" than the State's is unconstitutional. See pp. 9-10, supra. That this
concept applies to medical decisions is both obvious and the unanimous conclusion of all
courts that have addressed the issue. Id.
B.

No Other Remedies Were Available

The State of Utah voluntarily dismissed its petition for transfer of custody before a
final ruling was ever issued. Nevertheless, the defendants have previously suggested that
the Jensens could have appealed from the orders of the juvenile court. But which
order(s)?
The June 20 hearing on the 2-day summons continued the matter. The July 10
hearing ended with a stipulation that the Jensens would receive independent testing from
the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles, the results of which the parties were still
awaiting when the State obtained custody of Parker. The July 28 hearing reiterated that
no final recommendations would be made until L. A. Children's reported its test results,
which never happened; moreover, minutes of the July 28 hearing were not even available

8

Defendants have repeatedly claimed that the Jensens had their day in court before a
neutral, objective, and independent decision maker. What the defendants fail to
recognize is that, where that neutral decision maker does not have the full breadth of
evidence before him, and is acting under the impression that the state has performed at
least its minimum mandatory duties, the proceeding can never be "fair."
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until August 11 - three days after custody had already been transferred - and no written
order was entered until August 15. Only five days later, on August 20, the juvenile court
ordered more testing, set a discovery cutoff of September 29, 2003, and scheduled a
hearing "on the merits" for October 8-10, 2003. What would or could the Jensens have
appealed, and with sufficient time to obtain relief? The fact that the State Defendants
began aggressively pursuing arrest warrants and felony charges on August 8-13, before
there was even an appealable order regarding the commencement of chemotherapy
(entered August 15) illustrates the flaw in any suggestion that an appeal could have
alleviated the defendants' constitutional violations.
No other statutory or administrative remedies were available to the Jensens. Cf.
Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 2004 UT App 405, 103 P.3d 716
(plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies under the transportation regulations of
the Utah Administrative Code).
C.

Equitable Relief Would Not Redress the Jensens' Injuries

For longer than this country has been organized as a collective union, legal
scholars have recognized the importance of providing a remedy for the violation of a
constitutional right. In Federalist Paper No. 80, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
... there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to
constitutional provisions. ... No man of sense will believe that such
prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power
in the government to restrain or correct the infractions of them.
As Chief Justice Marshall observed in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison, a right
without a remedy is not a right. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Without

19

the availability of a remedy, a constitutional right is but a hollow shell protecting the
citizenry in name only. In the absence of a means to punish state actors for violating the
Utah Constitution and to provide residents with redress for such constitutional injury, the
state constitution will never deter egregious conduct or protect the rights of citizens. See
Deseret Irrigation Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398 , 52 P. 628, 629 (1898) ("All wrongs are
regarded as merely a privation of right, and the natural remedy is to put the injured party
in the same position as he was before the wrong was committed").
Defendants argued to the district court that the Jensens have sufficient redress for
their state constitutional violations through their common law claims. No supporting
analysis was provided, nor does any come to mind.

Moreover, allowing ordinary

common law claims to trump state constitutional claims evinces a disregard for the state
constitution. If no remedy were available for violation of independent rights guaranteed
by the Utah Constitution, that would greatly weaken the efficacy of the constitution.
The defendants argued in the federal court that unspecified "equitable relief
might have redressed the Jensens' injuries.

They did not articulate what equitable

procedure would have gotten Daren Jensen his job back, or unlocked the handcuffs on his
wrists, or paid the Jensens' legal bills, or reimbursed their jail bond, or salvaged their
reputation, or erased their emotional distress. No form of equitable relief could or can
compensate the Jensens for their losses. Violation of constitutional rights cannot always
be effectively remedied by injunctive relief. See Spackman, 2000 UT 87, \ 25. Id., citing
Bott ("if prisoners' rights under article I, section 9 are violated, injunctive relief may not
be adequate to remedy prisoners' injuries") and citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
20

(1979) (damages were appropriate remedy for unconstitutional termination in light of fact
that her former employer was no longer a Congressman).
In Spackman, this Court cited the court's observation in Rockhouse Mountain
Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 503 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.H. 1986) that
"damages are an inappropriate remedy for a constitutional violation where the alleged
injury 'can be undone' by the judiciary." The harm suffered by the Jensens cannot be
"undone"; they can only be made whole after the fact, as the Framers would have
intended. This is particularly true when the rights violated were fundamental, and a
damages award would serve as a greater deterrent to such deprivation. Non-existent,
speculative equitable relief is not an adequate remedy for the harm suffered in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, in the Jensens' earlier briefing, and at oral
argument, the Jensens respectfully request the Court reverse the judgment of the trial
court, and remand this matter for trial.
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